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Political Fact-Checking in the Czech Republic on the 
Example of demagog.cz and manipulatori.cz Portals
Abstract. Variety of portals and fact-check initiatives in the Czech republic is an interesting phenom-
enon, created as a result of a political tangling, information war, changes in contemporary media, eco-
nomic and social issues. in comparison to other countries from the Visegrad Group, these portals have 
developed significantly. this is understandable considering the complex social and political situation 
in the Czech republic as well as the development of new forms of communication. what is happen-
ing in this country can be considered as a kind of testing ground for the creators of fake news and 
fact-checkers. on the one hand, it is the struggle of various secret services and interest groups (mainly 
pro-Kremlin, pro-russian) that have an influence on public opinion by using techniques of manipulation 
and control of society. on the other hand, they are more and more advanced journalistic and scientific 
projects operating in the network, dealing with fact-checking. the article focuses on portal demagog.cz 
that verifies statements made by politicians and portal manipulatori.cz that checks facts and examines 
public debate in the Czech republic.
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Introduction
Fake news and disinformation are more and more predominant in the public Czech 
discourse and they become a real problem. The political transitions, parliamentary 
election campaign, occurring of the elements of hybrid war, as well as changes on 
the Czech media market have caused the growth in the amount of fake news in the 
public sphere.
Traditional media are increasingly disappointing in terms of reporting (not only) 
political reality. They limit themselves to offer messages, more and more often without 
checking their truthfulness. We observe less and less reliable analysis based on facts, 
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and more and more publications based on guesses and sensations, which marks de-
clining confidence in the media. The priority is given to speed, not the quality of the 
message, which is not conducive to the growth of public discourse and civil society. 
In this situation, it is understandable that fake news – the balance between facts, 
opinions and speculations, fiction is gaining the audience. On the other hand, there 
are more initiatives to balance these processes – it is often journalism combined with 
activity of academics, non-profit and NGOs.
Media of the third sector that is related to NGOs have not been much developed 
in Czechia and have not been of great importance until recently. Today they have 
developed to such an extent that they are essential in the creation of fact-checking 
structure. They are not dependent on the editorial office’s programme or the will of 
a given medium owner. It is important that a lot of fact-checking activists emanate 
from journalism. They had worked in traditional media; however, they resigned to 
protest against monopolizing the Czech media market by the concern owned by 
Andrej Babiš.
In 2014 and 2015, in the Czech Republic Internet network (as well as in the world), 
non-real and conspiratorial news about the economy and politics began to appear on 
an unprecedented scale. After the Russian annexation of Crimea and the beginning of 
the war in Ukraine they intensified. These were not just e-mails such as “chain letters” 
or phishing attempts, but also information affecting politics as well as public opinion. 
They were to activate mistrust of democracy, political elites, Western institutions and 
the so-called mainstream media, inciting hatred against specific groups (mainly ref-
ugees and Roma). It was and still is associated with the activities undertaken by the 
secret services of Russia and the groups associated with this country as well as with 
the deeper Czech social and political issues. The most important points include: the 
economic divisions fuelled by pro-Kremlin and interest groups (province vs. Prague 
and big cities), the big problem of corruption (also political), the increase in the im-
portance of populist and nationalist movements – political dominance by populist 
Andrej Babiš and created by him ANO 2011 formation. An important factor affecting 
the aggravation of the quality of public debate is also the controversial presidency of 
Miloš Zeman, which brings up extreme emotions in the Czech society1.
All this contributed to a strong society polarization, sustained by various types 
of information published in traditional and new media (above all in social media). 
Often this information was manipulated and untrue, driven by emotions, not facts. 
For this reason, many independent projects functioning in the network were created, 
that stand against the publication of false or manipulated messages. Initiatives have 
1  President Miloš Zeman is very eurosceptic and pro-Russian. He is known for his controversial 
statements and behaviors resulting from, e.g. alcohol problems and close ties to people cooperating 
with Russia. It is mainly about his advisers and consultants from the electoral staff – Vratislav Mynář 
and Martin Nejedlý (see: Dudek 2015; Fajnor 2017; Wasiuta 2018).
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been created to counteract fake news taken by journalists and academics. As in other 
countries, also in the Czech Republic, fact-checking understood as a process of prob-
lem or information investigation in order to verify the facts (Oxforddictionaries.com, 
2017) has become the support mainly for the deteriorating investigative journalism.
The analysis may be characterized as a cognitive one and the aim of the analysis 
is the description of particular portals that may be classified as fact-checking. This 
paper is the introduction for the in-depth case study and it is aimed at exploration of 
a new phenomenon based on already existing data. The description may be the basis 
for further analyses concerning the development of fact-checking organizations. It is 
a fairly new phenomena and scientists have recently started analytical and theoretical 
work (Amazeen 2017; Graves, Cherubini 2016; Graves, Konieczna 2015) in order to 
explain the development of fact-checking, how it is related to the authority relations 
and media transitions. Hence, it is worth describing a phenomenon in question and 
answer some questions which may result in inducement for in-depth analyses in the 
future. The analysis (including the sociopolitical context) was aimed at answering the 
questions that concern reason for the fact-checking portals development in Czechia, 
how this kind of services works, what are the similarities and differences between 
them, what is their role in the politics and on the media market.
In the article, the subject of the analysis will be the Czech sphere dealing with 
broadly understood fact-checking, and special attention will be devoted to two men-
tioned websites. The first of them – demagog.cz – verifies the facts using the fact-check 
method and checks statements made by politicians. They are evaluated in the category 
of truth, falsehood, misleading information or lack of verification. The second one 
– manipulatori.cz – is aimed at checking the facts, analyzing political debate in the 
Czech Republic and improving the quality of public discourse.
The situation in the Czech Republic in the context of fake news
Media in the Czech Republic have the least reliance among all public institutions. 
The level of trust in them varies between 30 and 35%, depending on the type of media, 
and trust in alternative media increases (30%) (Tuček 2017).
There are many reasons for such a situation. One of the more important is that 
the scenery of the Czech media has changed dramatically thanks to Andrej Babiš – 
a businessman, who first dominated the Czech business, then the media, now politics. 
Babiš is called “Czech Trump”, and before starting political activity, he had significant 
business influence – he is the second richest man in the Czech Republic. In 2013, he 
bought the Mafra2 media group – the publisher of the majority of the Czech press and 
2  Purchase of Mafra by Andrej Babiš was associated with the beginning of his political activities. 
A millionaire has connected to his business empire a group of new and traditional media. Mafra are 
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the largest daily newspapers such as Mladá Fronta DNES, Lidové noviny and Metro. 
Likewise to business, he quickly began to build a Mafra monopoly on the Czech mar-
ket, which resulted in marginalization of smaller, non-owned by syndicate media3. 
What is important, Mafra’s media became non-objective, actively participating in the 
election campaign of the billionaire and its ANO party. According to the Reporters 
Without Borders report from 2017, the concentration of media ownership in the 
Czech Republic has reached a critical level (Reporters Without Borders 2018). Many 
journalists who once worked in the concern, in protest against this situation have left 
and got involved in the fact-check projects.
Although Babiš is no longer formally in power4, the Mafra media continued to 
run a campaign for the Czech parliament in 2017, which presented the billionaire 
and his party ANO only in a good light. The campaign proved to be effective – Babiš 
won the election. Although the ANO group does not have a parliamentary majority 
(it has received almost 30% of support), it exercises power with Prime Minister Babiš, 
though earlier as a deputy he has lost immunity and criminal prosecution is being 
continued against him.
Another reason for the lack of trust in the media is the international situation, 
which has a significant impact on domestic affairs. Czech intelligence services amongst 
the 10 biggest threats to the state mentioned a hybrid war which combines convention-
al and other military means using non-military tools (BIS 2015, 2016). This is about 
Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns (in fact located in the category 
of information war5), which are considered one of the biggest threats to Czech inter-
nal security. Czech counterintelligence – the BIS Intelligence Agency (Bezpečnostní 
the largest newspapers in the Czech Republic such as the ones mentioned above, commercial radio 
and television (e.g. TV ÓČKO) and numerous Internet portals, including opinion-forming iDNES, 
lidovky.cz, or projects related to e-commerce and cellular network and dozens of other media-related 
ventures. Mafra media have a  great influence on Czech public opinion, hence the controversies 
appeared and there are attempts to limit their impact.
3  The activities of Babiš in the field of business and politics are part of the principles of 
berlusconization and media oligarchization (see: Pešek 2013).
4  In 2017, a  law on the conflict of interests was passed prohibiting members of the Czech 
government from owning more than 25% of shares in the media and related companies. Their 
enterprises cannot apply for state subsidies or public procurement. The act was called “lex Babiš” 
because it was supposed to force Mafra’s owner to give control over his influential newspapers 
and other media if he wanted to sit in the government (see: Groszkowski 2017). The billionaire 
transferred the official management of the Mafra corporation to the trust fund to avoid a statutory 
conflict of interest. Babiš is no longer the owner of the group, but has maintained much influence. 
This is evidenced by, among others, the “tape scandal” in which the billionaire was recorded, issuing 
instructions to the journalists group about embarrassment of Prime Minister Sobotka.
5  Information war will be understood as actions taken to achieve information advantage in 
relation to the opponent. It will be the information processing and fabrication, influencing information 
systems and computer networks, which is supposed to lead to disinformation in societies and their 
mutual antagonism (see: Lelonek 2017; Łuczuk 2017).
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a informační služba) – monitors attempts to build a network of people with similar 
views among politicians, public officials and lobbyists. It points out that what happens 
about influencing politics and Czech society is the result of a large-scale hybrid war 
conducted mainly against Ukraine, NATO and the EU. In the 2015 and 2016 BIS 
reports (BIS 2015, 2016), it is emphasized that Russian information operations are 
conducted in the Czech Republic, and focus on:
1. Strengthening pro-Russian groups and parties – today mainly populists, na-
tionalists, xenophobes and “against the system” people, e.g. Andrej Babiš ANO 2011, 
supporters of President Miloš Zeman, SPD Tomio Okamura, etc.
2. Weakening the strength of the Czech media and their information potential 
by powering disinformation and spreading propaganda – mainly related to EU and 
NATO policy. It is done mainly with the support of active pro-Kremlin websites 
spreading fake news. The best known are: parlamentnílisty.cz (has nothing to do with 
the Czech parliament, which distanced itself from the website), AC24.cz, prvnízprávy.
cz, aeronet.cz, novárepublika.cz, sputnik.cz (Czech branch of the international media 
center of the Kremlin), světkolemnás.cz, lajkit.cz, czechfreepress.cz, českoaktuálně.cz, 
svobodnénoviny.eu (in total, about 406 have been identified so far), and active groups 
on Facebook and others7.
3. Fuelling social tensions – polarization of society, mainly by promoting social 
attitudes related to Islamophobia, xenophobia, homophobia, fuelling distrust to de-
mocracy, division into “Prague and the province”, or preservation of the conservative 
family model.
These operations are carried out through a campaign of disinformation, manip-
ulation of public opinion, agents’ activities affecting decision makers and cyberat-
tacks8. In such a situation, the growth of polarization of Czech society, conflicts and 
fragmentation of the Czech political scene as well as high popularity of fake news 
content is noticed. According to STEM, 25.5% of Czechs believe in disinformation and 
24.5% believe alternative sources of information (Janda, Blažejovská, Vlasák 2016). 
The described processes greatly influenced the election success of the populist party 
ANO, which today exercises power in the coalition of the Czech Social Democratic 
Party (ČSSD) with the support of President Zeman’s party – the Communist Party 
of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM).
6  Disinformation and manipulation are spread, mainly proclaiming worship for Russia. Lack 
of transparency – no names of authors and owners are given, sources of financing are not indicated. 
Wider discussion of these websites in Janda and Víchová (2016).
7  Not only Czech intelligence deals with identifying websites that disseminate fake news. An 
interesting project is the website kospiratori.sk based on the initiative of the Slovak advertising 
industry. It created a list of websites that publish unreliable material that manipulate and misinform in 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. To date, 117 pages have been identified (see: konspiratori.sk 2018).
8  More about this subject – Janda and Víchová (2017).
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Fact-check in the Czech Republic
Up against threats to the quality of public debate and the rise of disinformation in 
recent years, several projects have been created in the Czech Republic that attempt to 
counteract this trend. In comparison with other Visegrad Group countries, the Czech 
Republic became the unquestioned leader. Even though the first advanced fact-check-
ing portal (demagog.sk) was created in Slovakia, not many organizations of this kind 
developed there, as it happened in Czechia9. In other Visegrad Group countries, the 
situation is similar, as there are not many fact-checking initiatives: the portals on in-
vestigative journalism and news verification, namely OKO.press and demagog.pl were 
created in 2016 in Poland. In Hungary, there is a portal urbanlegends.hu that verifies 
urban myths, rumors, frauds and also presents how to verify such news. However, it 
is an exception as the attempts to create other initiatives dealing with politics were 
blocked by Victor Orbán’s government. Thus, the Czech case is an exception and the 
development of fact-checking initiative may be observed.
The portals described not only carry out activities related to fact-checking, but also 
deal with education and research, create cooperation networks with schools (especial-
ly with universities), experts, journalists, other non-profit organizations both in the 
country and abroad. The weakness of this activity is that it largely depends on external 
financing, especially from European, American or regional foundations. However, on 
the other hand, it gives independence from local authorities, which is important for its 
credibility and quality. An important factor is also the fact that the majority of Czech 
fact-checkers originate from the journalistic environment, which is why cooperation 
with the media is easier for them – not only due to the previously acquired professional 
skills, but also the knowledge of the environment and the social ties that connect them 
(this is particularly seen in the case of the manipulatori.cz described hereinafter).
The leading fact-check portals in the Czech Republic are manipulatori.cz and 
demagog.cz, but it is also worth to mention other initiatives briefly. These are most 
often portals that attempt to verify information appearing in the public sphere. The 
best known are10:
1. Hoax.cz (created in 2000) – the oldest project. It publicizes and explains the 
mechanisms of counterfeiting going around the Internet (phishing scams, lotteries, 
fake viruses, etc.). The database of scams is updated regularly. It has a section delegated 
to falsehood and manipulations in politics. There is no page on Facebook and Twitter.
2. StopFake.cz (multilingual, international project created in Kiev, 2014) in the 
Czech version. It disproves false information, provides facts related to the conflict in 
Ukraine. It is also a platform for analysing Russian propaganda on the international 
forum. In the case of StopFake.cz, this is the tracking of Russian propaganda and 
9  More about fact-checking in Central Europe – EUFACTCHECK (2018), visegrad.info (2018).
10  Data from social media Facebook and Twitter – status as of 7 September 2018.
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fake news cases mainly in the Czech Republic. Facebook: 1,587 people like it, 1,608 
followers; Twitter: 372 followers.
3. HlídacíPes.org (2014) – an information medium created in opposition to An-
drej Babiš and media oligarchization. Project Institute of Independent Journalism 
founded by journalists once related to with Mafra and public media. It mainly deals 
with the abuse of power, the problems of democratic development, the influence of 
foreign intelligence in the Czech Republic (mainly Russia and China), and above all, 
investigative and fact-checking journalism. Facebook: 15,339 people like it, 16,026 
followers; Twitter: 11,900 followers.
4. Zvolsi.info (2016) – an educational project for youth in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia created in the Department of Political Sciences of the Masaryk University in 
Brno. Type of online guide in the field of disinformation and propaganda for young 
people, learning skilful and conscious (critical) use of the media – with emphasis on 
checking information, identifying fake news. Facebook: 13,570 people like it, 13,719 
followers; Twitter: no page.
5. Factczech.org (2016, cooperates with manipulatori.cz) – an educational vortal 
to help journalists identify and verify fake news. It runs educational campaigns for 
citizens. Facebook: 444 people like it, 464 followers; Twitter: 198 followers.
6. Kremlinwatch.eu (2014) – a think tank dealing with Russian propaganda, dis-
information and Kremlin influence in the Czech Republic and the European Union. 
Facebook: 2,813 people like it, 2,902 followers; Twitter: 6,482 followers.
7. Neovlivni.cz (2015) – database of contents from the Kremlin in the Czech 
Republic. It includes not only pure and overt propaganda, but also media that offer 
unofficial Russian propaganda subjects in the world in standard articles. It deals with 
investigative journalism, and recently with political and business connotations of An-
drej Babiš. Facebook: 19,256 people like it, 20,325 followers; Twitter: 17,700 followers.
Although most of them are initiatives with relatively little experience, based on the 
observation of interest in social media, it can be concluded that they gain systemati-
cally more and more public and increase significance in public discourse.
Demagog.cz
The projects presented above, dealing with identifying and counteracting fake 
news, are a very interesting phenomenon and require greater attention. However, due 
to the subject of the following article, the focus was on two leading projects directly 
involved in the issues discussed here. The first of these is the demagog.cz portal – 
a leading fact-check project in the Czech Republic operating since February 2012.
The project is directly related to the demagog.sk initiative and functions as a slight-
ly modified version of the Slovak original. It did not require too many changes due 
to the fact that it operates in quite a similar way in terms of cultural and historical 
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aspects of the countries11. Demagog.sk was a pioneer among fact-checkers in Central 
Europe. It was established in 2010 in Slovakia on the initiative of Mateja Hruška and 
Ondrej Lunter – students from the Masaryk University in Brno – and the Slovak 
Governance Institute – SGI (Inštitút pre good spravlovanje spoločnosť) (Hincová 
Frankovská, Sloboda, Turcsányi 2015). The immediate causes the portal was created 
were the parliamentary election (spring of 2010), the formation of the nationalist 
Slovakian National Party (SNS) and an election campaign largely based on populism 
and emotions. Its creation was inspired by the activities of such organizations as 
PolitiFact, FactCheck.org and The Washington Post Fact Checker. The project quickly 
succeeded – it was often quoted in the media, its methodology was available in the 
Czech Republic, Georgia and Poland.
Demagog.cz, like the Slovak prototype, is a non-governmental and non-profit 
organization, largely based on the work of volunteers coming from Czech universi-
ties and declaring that they are not affiliated with any political option. Demagog.sk, 
like its Polish and Czech versions, is financed, among others, from the International 
Visegrad Fund of the European Commission, Open Society Fund, the Czech national 
agency Mládež v akci, the US embassy grants. In its ethical code, the demagog.cz team 
declares that it is not affiliated with any political party (Demagog.cz 2016).
As it is declared by the founders of the Czech project, it aims to study long-term 
changes in public discourse, public sphere education, and it helps to understand the 
news in the age of information chaos in the Czech Republic. This applies in particular 
to the verification of what the Czech political elite is saying: pointing to truthless and 
manipulative expressions that limit public space (Demagog.cz 2018a). The creators 
of demagog.cz declare that they are independent and use publicly available meth-
ods, taking into account the standards of journalistic work (Demagog.cz 2016). They 
also do not have institutional background like Slovaks (SGI) and formal links with 
such institutions as, for example, the Masaryk University or the Charles University 
in Prague, where most volunteers and co-workers come from. Its activity is mainly 
based on the work of volunteers, using available Internet platforms, e.g. Facebook or 
e-mail. Gratification is not money, but the possibility of apprenticeships and intern-
ships, education and creation of social capital. At the head of the project there are 10 
people, 34 volunteers, trainees cooperate with them (Demagog.cz 2017c). Demagog.
cz is a member of, among others, International Fact-Checking Network.
11  The situation was adequate for other countries of the Visegrad Group – Poland and Hungary. In 
2014, in relation to elections to the European Parliament, attempts were made to create a demagogue 
version in the entire Visegrad Group. There was established (existing until today) a Polish version 
of demagog.org.pl on the initiative of the Jagiellonian Club in Cracow. In 2015, the demagog.hu – 
a Hungarian version (created by the students from the Budapest University Eötvös Loránd) – was to 
be launched, but due to organizational and political reasons, the project was suspended.
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Photo 1. Home page of demagog.cz
Source: demagog.cz, 15.06.2018.
Methodology of demagog.cz
Demagog.cz deals with public statements of politicians and other public figures, 
especially in political discussions. Substantive and objectively verifiable statements are 
examined and the aim is to check their truthfulness. Political, ideological and value 
judgments, predictions of some actions are not evaluated. It is justified because, on the 
one hand, as an organization declaring to construct a civil society, it would be limi-
tation to freedom of speech, and on the other hand, it is difficult to grade evaluating 
judgments and set a kind of “norm” – what is right or wrong. As it is declared by the 
creators of the portal, they want to disprove falsehood and teach critical thinking. 
Therefore, the facts, data, numbers, historical events, statements, past actions of public 
persons (mainly votes in the parliament or opinions on specific topics), which are 
objectively verifiable, are examined. The website uses up-to-date and public sources 
– primarily public online resources, professional studies and publications (Demagog.
cz 2014). As its creators declare, expert topics are discussed with experts and each 
justification goes through the control of two other people (experts in a field) who 
check the actual and methodological accuracy, correctness, coherence and logic of 
the statement (Demagog.cz 2014).
The analysis is based on legal provisions and studies. Due to the work of volunteers, 
statements of politicians are verified, the results are compared with the available ob-
jective data and classified into four categories: real, false, misleading (manipulation), 
unverifiable (Demagog.cz 2014).
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1. False – it is stated if the statement is inconsistent with commonly available data 
or information. It can also mislead the public by using incorrect indicators, selective 
data or providing information without pointing to sources or in the wrong context.
2. True – using the appropriate information in the correct context, coming from 
a reliable and representative source. Its credibility must be confirmed by a reliable 
and representative source. It is allowed to examine not entirely true statements with 
a slight deviation: the figures have a 10% threshold, “unless it is a number in which 
we do not tolerate inaccuracies (number of deputies) or when the politician itself 
ensures that it is accurate” (Demagog.cz 2014).
3. Misleading (manipulation) – intentional actions using statements between true 
and false, using the right facts, but in a faux or incomplete dimension, misrepresented, 
taken out of the original context. These are non-factorial arguments, fake conclusions, 
incorrect comparisons, using, for example, incomparable or incomplete data.
4. Unverifiable – information that cannot be proofread anywhere in publicly avail-
able sources. They cannot be confirmed or excluded, they contain statements that are 
too general or imprecise.
Demagog.cz content
The portal analyzes: information appearing in very popular and significant for 
the public opinion programs, such as Otázky Václava Moravce broadcasted on public 
television – ČT1; debates and current journalistic programs on TV Nova, Prima TV 
and Czech public radio ČRo; political discussions and interviews contained in MF 
DNES or iDNES.cz and other printed newspapers and websites. The material is very 
extensive: in 2016, 1,543 statements were analyzed, and in 2017 – 1,239.
Table 1. The most popular politicians on demagog.cz from January to June 2018  
(Demagog.cz 2018b) (as of 14 June 2018)
Politicians and their 
formation
Number of 
statements True False Misleading Unverifiable
Miloš Zeman – Strana 
práv občanů (SPO) 663 364 142 72 83
Jiří Drahoš – Nez. 140 111 7 3 19
Andrej Babiš – ANO 2011 577 258 94 90 133
Ivan Bartoš – Česká 
pirátská strana 115 82 9 10 14
Jiří Pospíšil –TOP 09 154 99 17 18 20
Total 1,649 914 269 193 269
Source: Author’s own study.
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The website is divided into three sections: “Reports”, “Special events”, and “About us”. 
Reports contain short statements and longer analyses of the current monitoring process 
of policy statements. Special summary reports were published in special events: “Prom-
ises of the ruling coalition. Special analysis of the election promises of the government 
of M. Sobotka (2014–2017)” (Demagog.cz 2017b) and “Promises of Miloš Zeman” 
(Plaček, Kunc 2018). The government of Prime Minister Sobotka (social democrat 
coalition, ANO and KDU-ČSL movement) was analysed in terms of what politicians 
were doing and their statements were reviewed. The analysis was carried out on August 
20, 2017 after the last meeting of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament. 
This was related to the parliamentary elections of 20 and 21 October 2017. According 
to the declaration, the authors of the report wanted to convince how the coalition ful-
filled the obligations set at the beginning of the term of office (included in the program 
statements and the coalition agreement). 156 promises have been identified in various 
areas concerning: security, law, health, foreign policy, economy, education, agriculture 
and environmental protection. It was examined whether the rulers were able to fulfil 
these promises on the basis of objective information. The promises were divided into: 
fulfilled, unfulfilled, and partly fulfilled (Demagog.cz 2017a):
– fulfilled, e.g. “We will liquidate the second pension pillar” (which happened);
– unfulfilled, for example, regarding the lack of increase in the tax duties for indi-
viduals or the fact that the government will attempt to improve legislation – talking 
about the organization of the referendum that did not happen. The authors point out 
that it was a very vague promise, where there was no specificity and it could not be 
verified objectively;
– partly fulfilled – the government promised wider access to culture and the intro-
duction of free enter days to the monuments. In fact, they have not been introduced 
in case of all monuments.
The report resulted in the statement that the government of Prime Minister So-
botka met 51% (69 promises), did not meet 38% (63), and partly fulfilled 11% (14) 
from what he described in the coalition agreement.
In the second report, published on 23 January 2018, 41 pre-election promises made 
by Miloš Zeman were examined. They were submitted during the election campaign 
5 years earlier when he was elected president for the first time. They were divided 
into three categories: promises regarding staff changes, constitutional competence of 
the president, and others. Types of promises:
– fulfilled (splněné sliby) (20 promises) – they concerned, for example, greater ac-
tivity of the president when it comes to participation in nominations of constitutional 
court judges or district courts judges;
– violated (porušené sliby) (14) – promises that the president has violated (he did 
not fulfill as promised) or promises he fulfilled, but in a different form, time and 
scope than he undertook, e.g. not interfering in the ambassadors nomination or not 
considering advisors who are not experts in a specific field;
Pobrane z czasopisma Mediatizations Studies http://mediatization.umcs.pl
Data: 20/11/2019 22:15:48
UM
CS
Katarzyna Giereło-Klimaszewska126
– unfeasible (nesplnitelné sliby) (3) – those that the president could not meet due 
to limitations of his constitutional power or other restrictions, for example, in the 
promise to pass the law on proving the origin of income and property, including the 
possibility of confiscating illegally obtained assets – it was not possible, because such 
eligibilities have the legislature;
– unrealized (nerealizované sliby) (4) – the president did not take any steps to 
fulfill the promise, or there were no circumstances that would allow him to refer to 
the promise, for example, the one concerning tuition fees in schools or premature 
resignation of the president from office.
The portal’s activities are transparent, which can be seen in the “About us” section 
containing complete information:
– What is Demagog.cz? (cz. Co je to Demagog.cz? ) – about the project, its creation 
and people creating it;
– How do we rate? (cz. Jak hodnotíme?) – research and methodology;
– Guidelines for readers (part of cz. Výtky k hodnocení) – about where and how 
readers can contact in the case of verifying information, which they want to provide 
to the portal;
– Finance;
– Ethical code;
– Frequently asked questions;
– Workshops offer;
– Czech this out! – a project to strengthen cooperation between selected non-profit 
organizations in the region (Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland), to exchange experience and 
find ways to improve the project’s internal functioning;
– Contact.
As mentioned before, demagog.cz is a copy of the Slovak project – both when it 
comes to evaluation methods, as well as organization of work, or web design. Czech 
employees, just like Polish ones, were trained by Slovaks. However, despite this, a large 
autonomy is given for each national version, which means that everyone can create 
their own applications and versions of the site that simplifies work in a given area (for 
example, in the case of demagog.org.pl12). The aim is to create tools that will enable 
automatic detection of false information using artificial intelligence as well as a wider 
usage of network and volunteering through social media. According to the chairman 
of the board demagog.org.pl Małgorzata Kilian, “We are also working on solutions that 
would place our fact-checking directly during the reading of information articles. (…) 
Readers would not have to go to our website to find out if the statement is false or not” 
(Rudnik 2017). This is particularly about how to share the evaluations posted on Dema-
12  There is less data and statistics in the Polish and Czech versions, they are less developed than 
the Slovak one. The Polish demagogue analyzes not only the statements of politicians but also their 
electoral programs.
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gog using the Share the Facts widget (also used by PolitiFact.com, The Washington Post 
and FactCheck.org). It makes it possible to spread reports on the Internet, i.e. it makes 
it easier for web-search engines to improve content recognition and distribution. The 
information is displayed as verified on Google and analyses are automatically transferred 
to the Twitter profile from Share the Facts.13
Manipulatori.cz
A completely different fact-checking venture is the Czech portal manipulatori.cz, 
founded and run mainly by journalists Petr Nutil and Ondřej Fér. The project was 
created in 2015 in the peak of the European refugee crisis, when a wave of false or 
distorted information about the subject came through the Czech media. It is more 
an information than research medium but has a significant share in identifying and 
describing all phenomena related to fake news, still financed from own resources and 
advertising. It is a media platform focused primarily on social and political issues from 
the very extensively understood public sphere. It contains analytical and journalistic 
texts on manipulation, propaganda and counterfeiting present in the Czech and for-
eign media. With support of the publicly available sources, documents and facts, it 
attempts to check and unmask false information. The content of the site is constantly 
updated and contains data related to disinformation both in the Czech Republic and 
abroad. So far, over 700 texts have been published (as of 8 September 2018).
Photo 2. Home page of manipulatori.cz
Source: manipulatori.cz, 15.06.2018.
13  See: Share the Facts, http://www.sharethefacts.org/, 15.06.2018.
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Manipulatori.cz is focused on following public lies, distorting facts, spreading 
hatred and describing issues related to widely understood political marketing and 
public relations. It is declared that its authors want to support a critical debate on 
social and political events in the Czech Republic, seek to improve public discourse 
and also want to follow psychological phenomena that “silent intellect in man, arouses 
evil and irrationality” (Manipulatori.cz 2018).
The portal is divided into the following sections (as of 18 June 2018):
1. Studies (studie) (88 texts) – analyses, reports, discussions and comments, e.g. 
the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic report summarizing the situation 
regarding the political development of the extremist scene or a 6-part text on the 
specifics of war propaganda (Větrovec 2015).
2. Fake news (hoaxy) (107) – defined by the authors as tricks, hocus pocus (Ma-
nipulatori.cz 2015). It is a database containing an explanation and justification as to 
why they were considered to be fake news. It concerns such topics as, for example, 
“Demonstration against Babia was paid by George Soros’ OSF”, “Immigrants in Ger-
many demolished the city”.
3. People (32) – descriptions or interviews with influential people of the political 
and public sphere in relation to fake news, for example, a description of false infor-
mation about the career of the presidential candidate in 2018 by Jirí Drahoš (Cemper 
2018b).
4. Politics (107) – deals with political campaigns and politicians, here is one of the 
most popular texts about politician Tomio Okamura, who along with his xenophobic 
party SPD14, wants to spread the newspaper Na vlastní oči in Prague. The authors 
of the portal expose the publisher, who in the earlier elections took part in political 
and electoral campaigns (in 2016 and 2017) misleading public opinion, and who is 
probably related to Russia (Cemper 2018c).
5. Psychology (30) – the most educational part of the website, describes the mech-
anisms of social psychology related to false information, ways of social manipulation, 
e.g. the Lucifer effect, lack of ethics in psychology, or how radical attitudes are de-
veloping inside people.
6. Communication – 78 texts on the subject of widely understood social and polit-
ical communication, election campaigns, social media, rhetoric, social changes, media 
content especially with taking into account fake news, e.g. the text on: havlismus or 
the political heritage of Vaclav Havel (Šmíd 2015) in the Czech media and political 
debate; reasons for spreading deceptions (HateFree Culture 2016); Trump’s tactics 
regarding fake news (Cemper 2017).
7. History – 35 texts mostly about the history of the Czech Republic and Czech-
oslovakia regarding censorship, unknown facts, and the history of propaganda, e.g. 
the text about the pogrom of Jews in 1945 (Moderní Dějiny 2015a); anti-American 
14  The SPD in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies won in 2017 over 10% of votes.
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propaganda in communism (Moderní Dějiny 2015b); the oldest Czech fake news 
(Nutil 2017a).
8. Tech (47) – contains texts on technological issues, mainly concerning the In-
ternet and Internet community, e.g. texts about: the e-shop cheating customers (Nu-
til 2017b), the analysis and identification of extremist groups on Facebook (Šlerka 
2016), discussions on the iDNES newspaper portal about the links between Russia’s 
supporters and those who are against Islam (Pilnáček 2015).
9. Monitoring – 83 reports on specific events, activities in the public sphere, e.g. 
reports on: the fact that Twitter has begun blocking disinformation websites (Cemper 
2018a); on the media enjoying the highest trust in the Czech Republic (Proti proje-
vům nenávisti 2018a); on the activities of Nela Lisková – advocate of Miloš Zeman, 
the Donetsk Republic and the fight against Black’s (Proti projevům nenávisti 2018b).
10. Lexicon – is a constantly updated set of 41 terms. They cover basic concepts 
and passwords that appear throughout the portal, such as: hoax, sources and statistics, 
books, facts, conspiracy theories, etc. All contain links to individual texts on the site.
11. Video – 21 reports from events, speeches, fragments of videoblogs, instruction-
al videos, e.g. lecture on critical thinking as a skill (Redakce manipulatori.cz 2016), 
guide to visual verification of photos and videos (Proti projevům nenávisti 2018c), 
report from the conference on manipulation of fear and civic engagement (Redakce 
manipulatori.cz 2016).
12. From the editorial office – team of editorial office, information about the portal 
in the media, the possibility of an apprenticeship, editorial support by notifying about 
fake news by readers, page likes on Facebook, followers on Twitter or financial support 
for the portal, which is maintained with its own funds and advertising.
Manipulatori.cz cooperates and supports similar projects such as hoax.cz, Watch-
dog or Faktus. In 2017, the portal joined forces with the Proti projevům nenávisti 
(Against Hate Display) research team established in 2013 (Proti projevům nenávisti 
2018d), hatefree.cz which tracks the manifestations of racism, homophobia, xeno-
phobia, discrimination and hate speech, and which, in a special section, deals with 
fake news.
Another initiative of the portal is the creation of the popravdě.cz party before 
the second round of presidential elections in 2018. The team headed by Petr Nutil 
followed disinformation during the presidential campaign. It found 39 lies about Jiří 
Drahoš, 15 lies about Miloš Zeman, 13 lies during TV debates. The initiative resulted 
in relatively high media interest, but it was a short-term project, because it included 
two weeks of the campaign between the first and the second round – from 12 and 
13 January 2018 to 26 and 27 January 2018. Currently, the team declares that it deals 
with monitoring the impact of e-mails spreading disinformation and actively fights 
against their spread.15
15  Facebook: 1,313 people like it (1,391 followers). Twitter: popravde.cz does not have a profile.
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Reaction
Every day, Czech politicians refer to information posted on both of the websites 
discussed, most often in social networks or through comments on the Internet. They 
also correspond to traditional media, sometimes by direct statements or official re-
sponses in the form of press releases or letters. Less often by e-mail or telephone. These 
reactions are described in both projects on an ongoing basis. Demagog.cz does so on 
the occasion of the assessment of further statements or in discussions – on the website 
https://demagog.cz/diske/, on Facebook and Twitter. Manipulatori.cz has a separate 
department – http://manipulatori.cz/reakce-na-clanky/.
One of the most interesting reactions of politicians is the website established dur-
ing the parliamentary election campaign by Andrej Babiš (mujdemagog.cz) under 
the significant slogan: “Do not believe what they said about me. None of this is true” 
[Neuvěříte, co o mně řekli. A nic z  toho není pravda]. The then candidate for the 
prime minister of the Czech Republic, following demagog.cz, wanted (on his own) 
to make the fact-check by criticizing the statements of the adversaries and evaluate 
their truthfulness (Břešťan 2017). In fact, it has nothing in common with fact-check 
– no sources of information are given, chosen without specific criteria, Babiš quotes 
himself, he takes information from the context.
Undoubtedly, the interest in analyses of the discussed portals is increasing. It was 
particularly visible in 2017, when the government of Prime Minister Sobotka had 
serious issues with maintaining the coalition, and more importantly, with an ongo-
ing parliamentary and presidential electoral campaign, which, in general, increased 
interest in politics.
Table 2. Presence of information related directly to demagog.cz and manipulatori.cz in the 
Google search engine (as of 15 June 2018)
2015 2016 2017 2018
Demagog.cz 57 65 175 163
Manipulátoři.cz 2 8 26 33
Source: Author’s own studies.
In 2018, the turnout of news in the media on the discussed analyses is even more 
intensive. It happened due to the January presidential election, issues in forming 
a new government by the winner of the elections of Andrej Babiš (ANO 2011) and 
the increasing polarization of the Czech society (see: Noch 2018; Dębiec 2018).
The events of recent years have caused that Czech Republic citizens’ interest in 
social media increased, which is the effect of the previously described less and less 
trust in traditional media and changes in the technology usage. This trend can be 
noticed on the example of Facebook and Twitter.
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Table 3. Interests of demagog.cz and maniulatori.cz in social media
Date
Demagog.cz Manipulatori.cz
Facebook Twitter Facebook Twitter
15 June 2018 29,251 people like it;  29,768 followers 17,012
14,307 people like it;  
14,856 followers 1,068
11 September 2018 29,339 people like it;  29,873 followers 17,600
15,029 people like it;  
15,635 followers 1,210
Source: Author’s own study.
Based on the presented data, it can be predicted that social interest will not descend 
in the near future. Probably fact-check services, such as manipulatori.cz, will upgrade 
their offer and, thus, maintain interest of both politicians and other recipients.
Summary
The Czech example shows that the combination of disinformation and socio-polit-
ical events can seriously undermine the quality of public debate. Fact-check services 
are a response to these processes and an attempt to stop them or at least publicize 
them. These portals, for sure, are to educate and inform, affect public opinion, but also 
try to enforce greater responsibility for the content of political public speeches and, 
thus, improve public debate. However, due to the speed of showing up information, 
the “manual” verification is no longer enough. Tools that will automatically pick up 
disinformation must be implemented, e.g. using machine learning or networking in 
various subjects.
The variety of fact-based sites in the Czech Republic can be considered a very inter-
esting phenomenon, created as a result of a complicated politics confluence: informa-
tion war, the issue of changes in contemporary media, economic and social problems. 
Compared to other countries from the Visegrad Group, these types of sites have devel-
oped to a significant extent, which is understandable taking into account the complex, 
socio-political situation of the Czech Republic. They also reflect the development of 
civil society. It seems like a kind of testing ground for the creators of fake news and 
their opponents. As in the optic lens, there can be observed trends that occur all over 
the world, and thus, on the one hand, the fight with special services (mainly Russia, 
but China or other countries should not be forgotten) trying to influence public opin-
ion and introduce the so-called reflexive management (see: Wojnowski 2015) – using 
techniques of manipulation and control of society. On the other hand, there are fact 
checkers (of different provenance)16 who try to oppose this. It is difficult to accurately 
16  It was not the purpose of this text to identify the origin of the creators of anti-fake websites, 
but for some of them the connection with secret services of other countries is being discussed. It is the 
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estimate the impact of both parties on socio-political processes, because the usage of 
fake news in the public sphere in such a wide dimension is quite a new and very dy-
namically developing phenomenon. Undoubtedly, fact-checking will become more and 
more important for the values maintenance by democratic societies, especially since it 
is an activity conducted under the conditions of a multidimensional information war, 
whose techniques and strategies are being constantly improved.
Due to the fact that fact-checking is a fairly new phenomenon, there is the lack of 
complex comparative data and there are a lot of questions to be answered in future, 
hopefully. The development of Czech fact-checking organizations is the effective ex-
ample of making public opinion aware of: the gravity of the fake news problem, the 
issue of verifying facts and conveying them to the public (as the interest is growing) 
and also emphasizing the importance of education, critical thinking and identifying 
disinformation. It is indicated by broad educational projects for young people (among 
which the most famous is zvolsi.info action), or creation of a unit that takes care of 
verifying fake news and publishing information about them at the Ministry of the 
Interior of the Czech Republic in 2017.
The technology development determines the growing need for fact-checking por-
tals development. As has been mentioned before, the paper is the starting point for 
description of this new and very diverse phenomenon. Therefore, it is too soon to draw 
conclusions on its influence in the long term. In the further research it is advisable 
to pose the question of how they will cope with more and more excellent techniques 
of information and disinformation creation. Inevitably, facts will be verified on-line 
and this process will be automated as it will be hard for information recipients to 
cope with a huge amount of data. The question concerns the way it will influence 
the quality of public debate. Additionally, there are questions that should constitute 
the basis for future analyses: Will the fact-checking remain neutral and impartial or 
will it be used in political battle, manipulating of public opinion and hybrid wars? If 
so, what will the finance transparency of fact-checking organizations look like? How 
will the methodology and facts verification by experts change? What will be the role 
of journalists and volunteers in the process? 
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